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LAW INTHE HANDS OF THE POLITICIANS
The Cycles of American Politics

RICHARD A.EPSTEIN*

Classical Liberal versus Progressive

It is a very great honor for me to address all the distinguished
guests from journalism, banking, law, and other professions who
have come to attend this lecture. I should like to thank the students sitting in the gallery, many of whom have heard me speak
three or four times previously. I regard their appearance on this
occasion as a tribute to their endurance, and not necessarily to
their judgment.
The designated title of this talk is Law in the Hands of Politicians. Josef Sima hinted to me that I might want to talk about the
various activities of the Obama administration, but I have decided to leave that topic to the last part of the talk. On this occasion,
I think that it is more important to offer some sense of the historical sweep of how law works and how it fails, when its formulation
is consigned, without serious constitutional limitations, to the
hands of politicians. I shall undertake this task with reference to
American politics, not with reference to the local situations in the
Czech Republic, with which I have at most only a passing familiarity. I shall proceed at a fairly high level of generality in order
to cover close to a hundred years of political evolution in forty
five minutes, which essentially leaves me just under two minutes
for a year. Given these constraints, I ask you to forgive me for the
occasional sin of superficiality.
Now, to approach this daunting task at a general level is to
isolate a single fundamental conflict that helps organize the entire
field. The conflict that occupies my thought over the last five to ten
years - the conflict between progressivism and classical liberalism
- is playing itself out quite dramatically in the modern American
context, but its roots go back certainly to at least 1913, when Woodrow Wilson became the president of the United States. Wilson, you
may not know, was a political theorist of no little influence in the
decades before he became a governor of New Jersey between 1911
and 1913 and President of the United States between 1913 and
1921. In his earlier academic role at Princeton University, where
he served both as professor and university president, he was in
fact one of the great defenders of the modern progressive state, as
against its classical liberal alternative, having written two important monographs on the topic, CongressionalGovernment: A Study
in American Politics in 1885, and Constitutional Government in

the United States in 1908, in which he argued strongly against the
American constitutional design with its system of divided government. My own intellectual orientation strongly resists any effort,
* Prague Spring Lecture of the Liberalni Institut, delivered on March 18,2010 inPrague, Czech
Republic. Published with permission of the Liberalni Institut and the CEROInstitut.
* I wish to thank Isaac
Gruber of the University of Chicago, Class
of 2012, for his usual valuable
research assistance.

Wilson's included, to create a more unified system of government.
I remain a stout defender of the classical liberal state against Wilson's modern progressive substitute.
The classical liberal position for these purposes contains
a couple of key elements, which I shall mention briefly in order
to set the stage for the subsequent evolution of American constitutionalism. Most critically, it sets its presumption against
the wisdom of state intervention at a global level, and therefore
embraces at the federal level the twin doctrines of separation of
powers on the one hand and checks and balances on the other. It
also embraces the notion that federal powers should be few and
determinate, leaving many issues to the internal governance of
the states. It reaches to this position because it accepts the view
that on average, new laws are unlikely to generate any kind of
a social improvement. Indeed, the more laws we have, the less
likely it is that a randomly selected new law will do any good. The
rules of diminishing marginal utility to effort apply to legislation
as they do to anything else.
The first battle between classical liberals and progressives
concern their opposite views on the presumptive desirability of
government action. Progressives believe that the nation contains
a class of individuals whose scientific expertise insulates them
from the petty influences of daily politics, so that the nation can
wisely entrust them with vast amounts of administrative discretion. Far from thinking of separation of powers as a political
virtue, they tend to regard it as a chronic nuisance which prevents the much needed consolidation of power in the hands of
administrative experts who can use their scientific wisdom to
make inroads into our major social problems. In my view, no one
is immune from political temptations, least of all those experts
who turn out to harbor strong political views after all. Trusted
with power, they cannot make good on the claim of dispassionate
scientific enquiry. Clearly, the Progressives are comfortable with
a far larger state than the classical liberals.
The second battle has to do with the organization of different
types of government power. A classical liberal treads cautiously
in developing systems of taxation, systems of eminent domain,
systems of regulation, and systems of infrastructure formation
and maintenance. As we see it, the central question asks how extensive are the administrative power that any nation should confer on government agencies. All governments have to enjoy some
monopoly power to maintain order. The challenge is how to erect
a set of competitive institutions on a structure on top those staterun monopolies. Competition unleashes a set of creative forces
that no government initiatives can hope to match. The challenge
is to make sure that the state powers needed to protect the competitive system from its private enemies do not become the com-
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petitive system's greatest nemesis. It is characteristic for governments to like order, which is always easier to regulate than chaos
and confusion. But the dynamism in markets rests in just that
chaotic environment in which large numbers of individuals engage in businesses that do not, either in fact or appearance, conform to any central plan. Yet when the pieces sort themselves out,
the resulting advances are far greater than any of those which
a government could create on its own.
By way of simple example, it is far better to have a patent system that allows private individuals to register and protect their
inventions than to have one in which government agents determine through national grants, pursuant to some industrial policy,
which new ventures shall receive financial support from government and which shall be left by the wayside. Cognizant of these
difficulties with state power, the classical liberal opts for small
government, in which businesses rise and fall, come and go, succeed and fail. The classical liberal embraces bankruptcy as a sign
of the system's health, even though it may be a personal tragedy.
It is far too costly to empower large government agencies to create state monopolies which, in virtue of their public origin, become impervious to the forces of change.
The progressives in fact hold exactly the opposite view on
this subject. Hand in hand with the strong administrative state,
they tend to favor various kinds of systems which will create
either private monopolies or private cartels. They fear disorder
and they tend to be very hostile to entry by new groups, because
they know that these new economic forces can upset the political domination of the organs of the administrative state that
they control.
These two clashing views are often in equipoise. In the United States, we have had three major cycles of progressivism and
classical liberalism over the last hundred years. Generally, the
cycles take this form: in the initial stage, the progressives push
hard with their grand agenda, and made substantial headway in
intellectual, political and constitutional discourse. Next, the classical liberals (or, more accurately, conservative groups) return
to power and are able to undo some, but not all, of the previous
cycle's progressive innovations. Some major exogenous event
then returns the Progressives to power, and the cycle starts anew.
In the United States, the history ran as follows. The Progressive
innovations of the Wilson administration are followed by the Republican contraction in the 1920s. The New Deal ushers in a new
wave of government regulation, which meets opposition by the
Republican control right after World War II. The Johnson administration introduces another wave of regulation in the 1960s,
which is met by the Reagan reaction of the 1980s. The start of
the fourth cycle is the Obama election of 2008 which introduced
major initiatives in health care and financial reform, and have
sparked a Republican reaction in 2010, whose significance cannot
yet be measured. Let us look at each of these cycles.
Progressivism, Round 1: 1910-1920
The theoretical views of Woodrow Wilson were put to a practical test when Wilson was elected Governor of New Jersey. There
his major achievement was to impose a stringent set of regulations on the corporations, most of which had at that time their
headquarters in New Jersey. The consequence of his initiative
was that these corporations marched in droves across the river to Delaware, where they found a more favorable regulatory
climate to set up shop, and where, after reincorporation, they
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still remain until this day. Wilson should have learned from this
episode that excessive regulation invites the exit from regulated
parties, but he remained undeterred in his convictions after he
became President.
I cannot talk about all of his initiatives that were put into place
before World War I intervened, but the list is impressive: the creation of the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Trade Commission, the progressive income tax under the Revenue Act of 1913,
the Federal Farm Loan Act, and the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914.
This last statute was devoted to increasing the enforcement of the
antitrust against monopolies, chiefly by attacking mergers that
might threaten competition, which is a hazardous endeavor at
best. The most conspicious feature of the Clayton Act in one sense
were Section 6 and Section 20, which essentially exempted from
the antitrust laws all agricultural organizations and all labor organizations. Its effect was to allow the formation of agricultural
cartels free of federal interference, and to facilitate the formation
of labor unions with the real force of market power, also free of
federal interference.
The effects of this initiative were socially undesirable. An
overwhelming intellectual consensus shows supports the view
that monopolies raise prices, reduce entry and reduce overall
consumer welfare. The antitrust laws, as a way to counter monopoly power, is a perfectly sensible form of intervention in labor
markets, where unionization can pose those exact threats. It was
a threat, for example, that Adam Smith well understood when
he talked about the dangers of contracts in restraint to trade, by
tending towards monopoly.
Retrenchment Round One: 1920-1930
The force of the progressive initiatives was blunted by World War
I, which directed our attention overseas. There is no question
that when Warren Harding and Calvin Coolidge became president, there were few new initiatives in labor regulation that increased the power of the state, with the notable exception of the
Railway Labor Act of 1926, which did much to freeze labor union
dominance of the railroads. The effects of the RLA included featherbedding-the most famous example being the requirement to
keep firemen onboard trains to shovel coal even after the wellnigh universal adoption of diesel engines-were not undone until
many years later, and then only at a very high price. So it is not as
though we undid most of happened in the progressive era; rather,
the nation did not do much to expand its scope much further. At
that point, new forms of technology and industrial organization
tended to erode slowly the control that government regulation
can exert over the larger economy.
Hoover and Roosevelt, The Odd Couple 1930-1945 In 1929, Herbert Hoover became president of the United States. He was a man
of impeccable public credentials who had served in the Harding
and Coolidge cabinets after a distinguished career in private business and government service, both during and in the aftermath
of World War 1.He, more than any other person, was responsible
for staving off mass starvation in Western Europe at the end of
World War I. In light of his failed presidency, however, few people today remember him for these major achievements early on
in his career. Hoover was in fact a progressive Republican who
had been mentioned as a possible Democratic presidential nominee before the 1920 election of Harding, a Republican. Franklin
Roosevelt (who ran as Vice President on the 1920 Democratic
ticket) ran on a explicit New Deal program that embraced much

www~ommolawieview.cz,

1'

.-

r

of the progressive agenda as developed in the first three decades
of the 20th Century.
The conventional wisdom in both the United States and elsewhere is that Hoover and Roosevelt ran quite different presidencies. The obvious point of separation was that Hoover was a Republican and that Roosevelt was a Democrat, such that the New
Deal really began somewhere in 1933 when Roosevelt took over
after Hoover had bollixed everything up during the previous four
years. Part of that conventional wisdom is indeed true; Hoover
did bollix up just about every major policy issue he faced as President. Indeed, as a senior fellow of the Hoover Institution, which
Hoover with commendable foresight funded with his own money
in 1921, I often pass by the modest monument on the Stanford
University campus that that marks Hoover's long life from 1874 to
1964. It mentions his great work as an author, engineer, humanitarian, public servant, and statesman. But it makes no mention
that he was President of the United States. He knew afterwards
that his term.as President was not his finest hour, which becomes
evident by looking at the various kinds of initiatives that he championed before Roosevelt took office. They all are evidence of a big
government frame of mind. Let me just mention three of them to
you or four of them to why this is the case.
First, Hoover reluctantly signed on to the Smoot-Hawley Tariff, which created very powerful barriers to trade with foreign
countries, which in turn generated all sorts of retaliation against
the United States. It thus set into motion a set of government initiatives that slowed world trade about by SO percent, give or take.
U.S. imports declined by close to two-thirds between 1929 and
1933, and exports declined by 61 percent, at a time when GDP declined by about 50 percent. Hoover was warned of the dangers; in
fact one of the great University of Chicago economists of the time,
Paul Douglas, later a U.S. senator, organized a petition signed by
over 1000 economists who told him exactly what would happen.
But Hoover yielded to his business constituents-Henry Ford was
a notable exception-many of whom had highly skewed views of
the world from their own narrow perspective.
One can imagine the litany: "my steel foundaries would do
great, if you just kept those pesky overseas steel makers from exporting goods into the United States." But the problem, of course,
is that imports and exports are always intertwined. If you keep
foreign steel out, the manufacturers in the export markets will
not have the the kinds of equipment and products that they need
to compete effectively in world markets. We make inferior goods
from a self-inflicted wound even in the absence of retaliation from
foreign nations. But some people do not learn from experience,
which is why this exact error was repeated in the Obama administration when it secured passage of the "Buy American" statute
back in the early part of 2009. This government effort to give a leg
up to national firms has turned out, as it has always turned out, to
send a dangerous message to the world that the President treats
other nations as a punching bag who should accept our exports but
not dare send imports to our shores. To support American exports
and deplore American imports is not the kind of message that resonates well in the Czech Republic. How can American intellectuals
serve as credible defenders of international free trade when our
President endorses this peculiar one-sided world view? Free trade,
in fact, helps all nations in both the long and the short run. Indeed,
as Smoot-Hawley's implementation clearly illustrated, high tariffs
hurt some American businesses severely for a whole variety of reasons, some technical, and some obvious.
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The second Hoover mistake made was the 1931 Davis-Bacon
Act, which essentially provided that government projects should
hire workers at "prevailing wages" rather than competitive wages. Davis-Bacon is still on the books and by entrenching union
positions, it raises the labor cost of government projects between
15 to 20 percent. It is worth noting that the explicit rational for its
passage was to prevent itinerant "colored" workers from competing head to head for employment with locals.
The third reform that Hoover championed was included in
the Revenue Act of 1932, which raised the taxes on the highest
incomes to a rate of about 63 percent. The effect of that statute
was to impair the ability of firms to accumulate capital for private
investment, which is one reason why the New Deal doldrums lasted until the onset of the Second World War. Once the high taxes
were in place, the Roosevelt forces refused to undo them. Instead,
they adopted an early version of stimulus programs to put that
money to work, which resulted in an inefficient substitution of
private investment by public spending. The same pattern is going
on in the United States today, to a somewhat lesser extent. But the
lesson should be clear. Stimulus programs do more harm than
good insofar as they crowd out private investments by emulating
the Keynesian ideal of digging large holes in the ground only to
fill them up again.
Fourth, it was on Hoover's watch that Congress passed the
Norris-La Guardia Act of 1932. Norris was a Republican progressive from Nebraska and La Guardia was a liberal Republican Congressman from New York City, who later became its mayor. The
gravamen of Norris-La Guardia was to displace the common law
rules that prevent conspiratorial behavior by unions seeking to
organize workers in secret so that they could be called out on
strike at the optimal time. By narrowing restricting injunctions
in federal court to cases of imminent violence, it tilted the scales
of government power in favor of union organization, in a continuation of the earlier policies of the Wilson administration, embedded in the Clayton Act. The Clayton Act kept antitrust enforcement on the side lines in cases of union organization. The Norris
La Guardia Act did much the same for common law injunctions
in federal court.
When Roosevelt got into power, he did nothing to undo any
of these unsound Hoover policies. The four statutes that I have
mentioned remain on the books. And Roosevelt added many
more. I can't begin to go into all of his policies because the man
essentially had a new scheme every day, most of them bad. But
let me just mention two of them, which still remain, I think, as
serious problems in the United States. One of them took a large
step beyond the Norris-La Guardia Act: the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, commonly called the Wagner Act, after the New
York senator who did the most to secure its passage. That statute
introduced direct government administrative controls over labor
relations by the creation of a National Labor Relations Board,
which legitimated the system of collective bargaining, which
had, and has, two features. First, it organized elections in which
unions could become, by majority vote, the representatives of all
the workers in some bargaining union designated by the National
Labor Relations Board. Second, once the union was in place, the
employer was placed under a statutory duty to bargain with the
union in good faith.
Competitive labor markets were thus subject to a huge dose of
government monopoly power. In the short run, the 1935 scheme
looked very grand for the unions and their members. Sure enough,
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by 1954, American unions reached their zenith when they represented about 35 percent of the total labor force. Unions like the
United Auto Workers offered testimony to the rise of union power.
But in the long run, successful unionization killed the goose that
laid the golden egg. A succession of labor agreements solidified
high wages and onerous work rules that made the once-dominant
American "big three" of General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler near
basket cases, shedding workers right and left because they could
not keep up with foreign competitors organized along far more efficient lines. General Motors shrank from 500,000 workers in 1979
to about 41,000 workers in 2009, and all union representatives attribute that blood letting to pro-management labor policies that
limited their ability to organize and bargain. To this day, union
leaders do not understand essentially that no one, unions included, can sustain that kind of monopoly power in the world of global
competition. The reforms that ushered in an age of wine and roses
for the workers between 1935 and 1960 have wreaked devastation
on the workers of 1990,2000, and 2010. One need only look at the
condition of Rust Belt towns that have been decimated-Akron,
Youngstown, Flint-and the list goes on. This breakdown of formerly prosperous towns in the Midwest is not a laughing matter.
It is is a very serious situation. The failure of the union movement
is reflected in shifts of population away from union strongholds
like Illinois, Michigan, New Jersey, Massachusetts. New York, and
Ohio-all of which have lost electoral votes in both the 2000 and
2010 census. The winning states tend to be those which stronger
protections against unions, led by Texas, which picked up four
seats in the electoral college after the 2010 census.
The second major mistake during the New Deal was the conscious decision of the federal government to strengthen agricultural cartels. The several Agricultural Adjustments Acts of
the New Deal period are still on the books, and these essentially
require the government to pay farmers huge subsidies for farm
goods. The United States then takes the artificial glut thereby created and resells it at bargain basement prices overseas, where
cheap imports can wreck small struggling economies whose domestic production cannot compete with subsidized American
farm goods. The subsidies remain, even though American agricultural production has improved mightily. The proper response
is to let any excess capacity go out of business so that the resources can be redeployed elsewhere. But the refusal to bite the bullet
on this key issue results in huge transfer payments which impose
penalties on all other economic activities. One lesson about free
trade that needs constant repetition is that the creation of government subsidies can do as much harm as government tariffs. In
one sense, the subsidies are more dangerous. The source of payment is hard to isolate so that it is difficult to organize political opposition to so unworthy a cause. In addition, these subsidies are
far more difficult to root out because they are often embedded
in other programs, such as below-market government services to
farmers who have widespread political influence, especially in
the United States Senate.
Reaction and Consolidation:1945-1960 After the Second World
War, the Republican reaction did not lead to any major changes

in agricultural policy, given that the farm states were often a bastion of Republican electoral restraint. But it did result in two responses to the large grant of administrative power that defined
the New Deal. Two statutes stand out from this period. First, the
general statute, the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, sought
to place greater limits on how these agencies dealt with both mat-
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ters of law and of fact. On the legal question, the APA conferred
final authority over legal questions to the courts. On factual questions, it required these to be supported by substantial evidence.
The APA did make a difference, especially in the short run, but
by no stretch of the imagination did it return matters to the place
they were in before the advent of the New Deal reforms.
The APA did nothing to repeal or modify any substantive statute. The major development on that front - the second statute was the bitterly contested Taft-Hartley Act, enacted into law over
President Harry Truman's veto in 1947. The law was enacted in
large measure as a response to the massive amounts of labor unrest that had been unleashed in the immediate postwar period,
after the no-strike arrangements of World War II were no longer
in place. I own an compendium volume of New York Times front
pages, which which contains selected headlines and stories from
1851 to the present. One of the most conspicuous features of the
pre-and post-War front pages is the level of labor unrest, strikes,
and stalemates during that period. Taft-Hartley was meant to take
back some of the advantages that the unions had won under the
earlier Wagner Act. It did not, however, restore the situation to
what it was in 1928-29 before the major New Deal reforms were
put into place. So, the government itself still gets bigger.
The Eisenhower era of the 1950s was a period of consolidation.
President Eisenhower was not a rebel; nor was he devotee of big
government. So one of his major initiatives, interestingly enough,
was to secure passage of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956,
whose full name, in fact, is the Dwight D.Eisenhower National System of Interstate and Defense Highways. Owing to the Cold War,
the word defense was put into the title of most major government
initiatives, including the National Defense Education Act of 1958,
another Eisenhower initiative that was enacted in response to the
Soviet launch of the Sputnik on October 4,1957. Both of these programs concentrated on relatively traditional areas of government
involvement; infrastructure in the case of the highway act, and education, under the NDEA. The modest level of aspiration produced
a pretty solid period of performance, including large dents in U.S.
poverty levels, all on the basic assumption that general economic
prosperity is shared by all people up and down the economic spectrum. It is not that things were perfect. Nonetheless, if the state
does not enact major new social programs, it gives private institutions breathing space to adapt to the regulations already in place.
Indeed, one of the famous sayings of John F.Kennedy, that "a rising
tide lifts all boats," captures the proper approach perfectly. General improvements work. Factional efforts produce social dislocations in both the long and the short run.
Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon - the Second Odd Couple:
1960-1974
The situation starts to shift more dramatically with the massive dislocations of the 1960s, starting with the attack on racial segregation
by the civil rights movement, and the ever-greater unease over the
Vietnam War. With the death of John F. Kennedy, the populist Lyndon Johnson takes over. The defeat of Barry Goldwater generated
strong Democratic majorities in Congress, paving the way for the
next chapter of the powerful progressive agenda. It is, moreover,
important to note that much of that agenda was entirely consistent
with the small government classical liberal position. The systematic exclusion of African-Americans from political power was totally
demeaning and political inexcusable. The maxim that each person
should count for one and only one gives some clue to the massive
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injustice involved with segregationist practices. The only question
was to figure out how how best to straighten out th e voting system in the South, a difficult task that, without questi on, required
a heavy dose of federal intervention to undo the undes erved power
of entrenched segregationist majorities in all too man y places. The
difficulties in this area were not immediately appar ent, but they
largely stemmed from the sin of overambition. It m ide perfectly
good sense to open the polls. But federal oversight wvas on much
shakier ground when it shifted its target to the gerry mandering of
local districts in order to maximize the level of black representation in Congress and the state houses.
The civil rights movement of the 1960s was not directed just
toward toppling public segregation. It also targeted labor markets
for comprehensive regulation in ways that undermir ed the vitality of competitive forces. On this score, there was lit tle objection
to federal efforts that sought to control the level of e xplicit segregation in public employment. But the effort to introd uce a strong
antidiscrimination principle in private employment raised more
difficult questions. As a transition measure, it had n uch to commend itself as a counterweight to the excessive level s of segregation that were a result of state policies directed towa rd that end.
Between, say, 1965 and 1975, the effects of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 were generally positive. But once that transitio nperiod was
over, the picture turned more cloudy. Ironically, the one place in
which they may have been justified was in the effor to curb the
extensive racial discrimination by unions, which wa s made possible largely because of the exclusive representation that they received under both the Railway Labor Act and the National Labor
Relations Act. But apart from that (important) appli cation, it has
been difficult to find any positive effect associated from the impact of these laws in otherwise competitive labor ma rkets, where
it is likely that they have done more harm than good . Thus, these
statutes made it very difficult to sort workers by various kinds
of psychological tests, given that most of them ten ded to have
a disparate impact by race. And the ability to fire a id hire were
heavily limited by judicial decisions that were quick to find some
racial animus behind various decisions.
In the late 1980s, some judicial decisions sought to cut back on
these laws, but they were quickly rebuffed by the p assage of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, engineered in the first Bush administration. That statute marked a bipartisan consensus o nthe continued role of civil rights laws in the American future.] By that time,
the adjustments on race and sex had changed the in .portance of
the law. Indeed, the real focus came to be whethe r affirmative
action programs could survive the colorblind injun ctions of the
civil rights laws, which they generally have, with onl'y some modest difficulty. The real shifts in this area came with t he extension
of the age discrimination laws in 1986, which removed mandatory retirement limitations from just about every oc cupation except for a seven-year exemption law enforcement officers, firefighters, and, yes, tenured academic faculty. The latte r exemption
was blown away by 1994, and the long-term aging of American
universities is attributable in part to this interventio n,which prevents an orderly shift of power and influence across the generations. There is a real danger that universities will be staffed by
people who are too old to do there their best work Faced with
this restriction, however, there is nothing that the u niversity can
do except to buy them off. Unfortunately, in bad time s, many people aren't taking money because they fear that once the buy-out
money is gone, their depleted pensions will not be sufficient to

maintain their life styles. In saying all this, I have no objection
to universities voluntarily hiring faculty members that other private institutions have asked to retire under their own internal
policies. Indeed, it is just that lure of a fresh second career which
helps keep people who are at the end of their original appointments working at a higher level than might otherwise be the case.
The burst of government activity in the Johnson administration was matched by the level of government activity under Richard M. Nixon, who also turned out to be a big-government figure.
The early 1970s saw the passage of the Environment Protection
Act in 1970, the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, the
Endangered Species Act of 1973, The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, the Civil Rights Act of 1972,
including Title tX's requirements of "gender equity" that has exerted a continuous, pronounced, and adverse impact on intercollegiate athletics at the college level. Coverage under early statutes, such as the Civil Rights Act, and the Medicare and Medicaid
programs of 1965 also expanded apace. The combined impact
of these programs doubtless had something to do with the economic stagnation of the 1970s under the Carter Administration.
I still remember that when my wife and I were seeking a home
mortgage in April, 1980, the going rate for a long-term mortgage
was 16 percent, which tumbled to under 12 percent by July of
that year. Carter lost the election that fall, because those infiaton rates turned out to be utterly unsustainable and politically
unacceptable. Yet even here there was some notable instances of
deregulation, most notably in air transportation with the repeal
of the Roosevelt-era Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, gutted by the
Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, which with bipartisan support
stripped the CAB of its authority to set fares, routes, and conditions of entry into the airline industry. In at least one area, the lesson that free entry trumps administered prices had been learned.
The Reagan Reaction: 1981-1989

The arrival of Ronald Reagan in the VAhte House in January 1981
did mark a change in governing philosophy and return to the philosophy of small government. But again it is critical to be careful
of what is meant by this retrenchment. In technical terms, Reagan changed the second derivative, but he did not change the first
derivative on the rate of growth in government. What I mean by
that cryptic statement is that government continued to get larger
under Reagan, but it did so at a slower rate than earler. On the
positive side, the Reagan tax reform legislation of 1986 did both
lower rates and remove a number of tax loopholes, both of which
are consistent with the general prescription of Adam Smith in
favor of a lower rates off a broader tax base. On balance, these
reforms did put some pop into the economy.
With respect to regulation, for the most part, Reagan introduced no major new initiatives in this period to expand the size
of the government market. This was also the period where Margaret Thatcher in Great Britain pursued a similar policy. The
Reagan era did see the expansion of the role of government in
health care, with the passage of the National Organ Transplant
Act of 1984, and Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor
Act (EMTALA) of 1986. The former killed any emergent market
for the sale of organs, and has precipitated chronic shortages of
kidneys and neediess deaths to boot. The latter has put enormous
pressure on hospital emergency rooms, which has led to many
closures. The former represents a negation of freedom of contract. The latter represents the dangers of forced association. It
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seems clear that the public at large may well have been skeptical
of supposed virtues of larger government, but it did not coalesce
around any coherent laissez-faire orientation.
Perhaps the greatest achievement of Ronald Reagan, and those
most dear in the Czech Republic, was the breakdown of the Soviet domination over eastern Europe in 1989. For those of us old
enough to remember the rise of the Berlin Wall in the summer
of 1961, the transformation was at once both stunning and unexpected. The public failure of the socialist system may not have
ensured that all was well inside the Western democracies, but it
did provide an object lesson of the major dangers, both political
and economic, of all variations of Marxism and socialism-a lesson that we would all do well never to forget.
George W. H. Bush and William Jefferson Clinton:

Another Odd Couple: 1989-2001
The presidency of George H.W. Bush marked, in my view, a start
of the return to the policies of the progressive era. The two most
notable events in that period on the domestic front were the
tax increase that he introduced in 1990, in violation of a campaign promise. That may well have cost him the 1992 election,
in a three-cornered race with Bill Clinton and Ross Perot. Of longer significance - and greater mischief - was the passage, with
Bush's support, of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The ADA
has transformed architecture for the worse, as the requirements
for wheelchair access alone can add as much as 20 to 25 percent
to the cost of new construction and improvements and modifications. The statute has also transformed employment markets, with
constant tension over the question of just what accommodations
for disabled workers are required and which of them could be
rejected as "undue." In and of itself, this change is one that can
be absorbed without undermining labor markets. But when conceived as a part of a larger system of employment regulation, it has
to count as one of the key drivers of the present high levels of unemployment. Consistent with economic predictions, the adaptive
responses of employers anxious to avoid the onerous obligations
of hiring workers with disabilities, the percentage of disabled
persons in the workforce shrunk after passage of the statute. It
is a classic instance in which unintended consequences matter.
The presidency of Bill Clinton should not in my view be regarded as a period on which there has been a massive expansion
of government authority. Once we put aside his evident personal
peccadilloes, he had a sense of the limits of what types of economic regulation could be attempted by a President who wished
to remain in office. He did not learn that lesson at the outset, but
rather had committed himself to a national health care bill that
was simplicity itself relative to the ObamaCare legislation a generation later. But he sensed that the country was not ready for
this proposal, and backed off so that by 1994, with the Republican Congress in place, he was able to moderate his ambitions. At
that point, he registered some solid accomplishments. His general program to ease people off of welfare has to count as a solid
success, and his willingness to pursue trade liberalization with
foreign nations is, if anything, even a larger plus to the overall
situation. He did in fact raise taxes, which did not produce major
negative consequences given the tremendous rate of technological advances in the period, which produced huge stock market
gains until they ended in the Internet bubble of early 2000, which
was, fortunately, far more confined than the dislocations that
took place in 2008 under the second George Bush.
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George W. Bush 2001-2009: The Modest Response

The cycle of reaction sputtered some with the second George
Bush, whose record on the size of government in domestic matters was decidedly mixed. The second Bush scores well on tax
reform, where he sought to lower both capital gains and ordinary income taxes. But in his first term especially, he did badly on many other domestic measures. He was a Republican he
was willing to pass major legislation that tied into a big government agenda. He was instrumental in extending federal control
over education through the No Child Left Behind statute which
marked a huge increase in government funding for education
at the federal level and a huge expansion in the effort to monitor teacher performance in the classroom, with a set of metrics
that never quite seemed to work out as intended. The problem
of teacher evaluation is exceedingly difficult even when done at
the school level, where all sorts of direct observational inputs can
be had. But from a remote perch using only test data, the task
is truly difficult and has led to constant complaints from nearly
every quarter, some of which are not just a union response to the
effort to introduce management into an area in which tenured
teachers have all too much protection.
On the corporate side, the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation, pushed
through in 2002 after the Enron scandal of the previous year, has
been the source of immense frustration with its heavy disclosure
obligations on senior management, and the huge exposure to liability when the internal audits are not done in the right fashion. The issue is not criminal prosecutions, of which there have
been virtually none. It is with the routine costs of compliance that
have hampered the operations of public companies. Today, many
private corporations do not go public, lest they be caught in this
regulatory web. The decision to be bought out by a public corporation may ease compliance costs, but it could easily spell the end
of getting the next eBay or Google to go public: Facebook did not
take that path in its recent effort to expand its ownership base,
for example. Many public corporations have been taken private
in the effort to escape the regulatory burden. And many foreign
corporations have decided to delist from the American exchanges
to escape regulation. The number of new offerings done in London and Hong Kong has gotten quite large relative to New York.
No one thinks that Sarbanes-Oxley has nothing to do with this.
The only real question is how much.
Third, Bush II created a huge new Medicare entitlement for
prescription drugs under Medicare Part D,passed in 2003, which
went into effect in 2006. The program has been run far better
than might have, had it relied on government monopoly power to
drive down prices at the expense of innovation. But the long term
cost implications are not clear, given the huge cost overhang that
Medicare places over the economy.
Barack Obama: The Progressive Revival 2009-????

So at last we arrive at the presidency of Barack Obama, who in
March 2010 managed to pass the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (aka ObamaCare), followed up in July with the passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. This pair arguably counts as the most massive regulatory innovations ever, given their incredible complexity. There is
no way to discuss their intracacies here, but it is important to note
the narratives that led to the passage of these statutes.
In dealing with the financial issues, the winning party line
was on the interventionist side. In their narrative, the tragedy of
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2008 was attributable to greed on Wall Street, for which legislation
twenty-one months later was the answer. One part of the legislation created the Financial Services Oversight Council, to allow the
government massive oversight over the way in which large firms in
the financial sector operated. Another part created the Bureau of
Financial Consumer Protection, charged with guarding consumers
against various types of frauds, deceptions, and abusive practices
that surely happen in some cases, but which did not happen in all.
I think that both halves of this statute represents a serious
overreaction to what transpired, for the proper approach to the
financial meltdown is to divide the burdens. On the private side,
one conspicuous failure was that the models used to securitize
mortgages were surely too optimistic. They did not take into
account the risk of common mode failure, such as those which
stemmed from bad government policies or adverse economic
events elsewhere. Hence, they were mispriced in ways that understated risk, and which contributed to the initial boom.
Once the entire situation started to unravel, a second risk
emerged. There was no doubt to my mind that firms under huge
financial pressures will take desperate measures today in the
hope that they can recoup their losses. For example, Lehman
Brothers booked some loan transactions as if they were sales, in
order to disguise their weak financial condition, at least in the
short run. All these technical maneuvers take their toll. If a transaction is a bona fide sale, it means that assets are taken off the
books, and debt is reduced with the proceeds of sale. The reduction in leverage stabilizes against long term risk. But if the sale is
really a loan, because of an option to resell given to the supposed
buyer, all the risks of a leveraged operation remain.
One sobering note, however, is that these actions took place
while the Securities and Exchange Commission was on the job. But
it missed most of the risks, just the way it missed the Ponzi scheme
of Bernard Madoff that collapsed with the downturn in stock
prices. The risk here with the SEC is, in part, explained by mission
creep. The SEC lost sight of its chief function, which should be to
prevent fraud, and it sought to introduce a regime of fairness into
capital markets. That regime is often counterproductive because
it its desire to equalize the flow of information tends to reduce the
returns to investments in finding information, so that less information is gathered. The costs of running this new venture is thus
a distraction from the more routine business of fraud prevention.
The lackluster performance of the SEC was not the government's only failure. Some key financial decisions during the
Bush administration helped create the devastating bubble in
home mortgages in the first place. During the Bush administration, a liberal Democratic Congress pushed for an expansion of
loans from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to high risk borrowers.
The Federal Housing Administration followed suit, as did private
bankers under the influence of the Community Reinvestment Act
and the Department Housing and Urban Development until over
two-thirds of mortgages (19 million out 27 million) were either
issued or guaranteed by one or another government entity. At the
same time, the Federal Reserve ushered in an era of cheap money
that allowed people to bid up the value of housing to what turned
out to be unsustainable levels. Private lenders followed suit because they thought, correctly as it turned out, that they were protected by an implicit government guarantee against failure.
Now, what is the definition of the guarantor? The old Yiddish
joke is that a guarantor is a jerk with a fat wallet and a fountain
pen. Quite simply, a guarantee is an invitation for lenders and
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borrowers to engage in high risk actions at the expense of third
parties. The only way to stop the flood of bad transactions is to put
conditions upon the use of borrowed money so that the guaranteed parties will be prevented from playing the high risk gameheads, I win; tails, the guarantor takes all the losses. The government agencies did not attempt to put these safeguards in place.
Thus, on the inevitable collapse of the market, much of the losses
came straight back to the United States government, in sums that
may eventually exceed $300 billion. The episode was a desperate
failure of central planning. Yet this lesson was not learned, so that
to this very day, many people insist that the market, and only the
market, bred the dislocations that followed.
Against those serious risks of disguised transactions, some oversight in the eleventh hour might be able to protect against these
devices, assuming that one knew what was happening and how it
should be countered, which is not easy to do given the very rapid
pace of events. But Dodd-Frank is likely to make matters worse. Its
use of regulation to protect against "systematic risk" in the private
sector has the unfortunate consequence of creating huge systematic risks by putting the entire financial sector under the control of
a financial services czar, the Financial Stability Oversight Council,
which concentrates truly awesome powers in the Secretary of the
Treasury, and the key heads of other financial agencies in the United States. The same can be said on the consumer protection side of
Dodd-Frank, in the form of the Bureau of Financial Consumer Protection, which likewise has enormous powers that are answerable
chiefly to the Oversight Council, one of whose members is the head
of the BFCP. There is good reason to believe that the supposed cure
will be the source of greater instability, precisely because of the
want of decentralized decision-making authority, which remains
the single best protection against common mode failure.
I have similar fears about the peculiar complex programs that
are used in ObamaCare, which now sits on the books. Its first
weakness is that it distributes new entitlements to health care as
if they were cotton candy. Some degree of subsidy is offered to
persons that receive 400 percent of poverty income, which embraces well over half the population. Yet it is never made clear
that the taxes that are cobbled together will hit by indirection
the very people who are supposed to receive subsidies. Needless
to say, the costs are driven up further by the huge increases in
the mandated benefit packages for private insurers, and a large
expansion in the Medicaid population which cannot be fully
funded. There are layer upon layer of oversight by a combination
of state and federal officials, the likely consequence of which is
to induce employers to close out their plans so that workers will
have to get coverage from government plans whose contours are
as yet completely uncertain until vast new reams of regulations
issue. The original sale of this program depended on the famous
promise that "if you like your current health care plan, you can
keep it." Well, the answer is that you cannot. The final legislation
has made a five-year survival rate system the most optimistic outcome. Most plans will have to meet federal guidelines sooner to
survive. It turns out that in the hasty press of political reform, the
grandfathering protection just disappeared.
In the end, the entire system will be either government run
or government regulated. But how will it work? No one knows
for sure. I have studied this program in detail and confess that as
of present I have but only a slight sense of what it all entails and
how it should be managed. But the ultimate fear is that the strict
controls on cost that will be put into place will not match with the
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mandated benefits, so that the entire system could collapse from
overambition. Right now in the United States, there is a concerted
effort to repeal, postpone, or modify the entire legislation. No one
knows how this will proceed. The President can veto any major
reform. But the Republican House of Representatives can put the
kibosh on major appropriations for these programs. The tug of
war shall continue throughout the next Congress.
These two statutes on health and finance are consistent with the
general New Deal program whose reach they extend. The SEC was
itself big into consumer protection; health care could be regarded
as an extension of the original Social Security program, which is
now out of financial whack. On other issues, moreover, the Obama
Administration has returned to the misguided progressive principles that long animated the New Deal. Thus on free trade, Obama
continues to show an icy hostility to all sorts of free trade treaties,
be it with Colombia or South Korea. On this matter, he serves the
interest of organized labor whose high wage packages cannot survive foreign competition. Yet it comes at the cost of opening up our
own markets to foreign products that are needed here, not only
for consumption, but also to make the goods with which American
firms hope to compete overseas. Leo Gerard, who heads the United
Steelworkers, is the number one complainer for the trade union
movement in the United States, and is willing to initiative major
antidumping litigation to keep out foreign products.
Secondly, like Roosevelt and Hoover before him, but unlike
John Kennedy, Obama is at heart a champion of high progressive
taxes, stiff capital gains levies, and a tough estate tax. These policies were thwarted in the short term, i.e., for two years, by the
tax compromise legislation in the lame duck session of Congress
after the November 2010 election. Right now, he has been held in
check. But left to his own devices, he would surely drive taxes increases, notwithstanding their adverse effect on investment. He
is a man who is all-too convinced that strong policies of redistribution have little or no effect on production.
Unfortunately, the road to disaster lies in the effort to cure government disasters by higher taxes (which mean a larger public
sector). What is needed in all cases is a lowering of public expenditures so as to allow more private investment. What is needed are
vibrant capital markets that can attract the foreign capital now being driven from American shores under our jingoistic economic
policy. I can say from personal knowledge of Obama from his days
at the University of Chicago Law School that he simply has never
internalized any of the insights or lessons from neoclassical economics. Obama had some economics advisors--Christina Romer
was one-who thought that high taxes had counterproductive tendencies. But Obama's gut instincts run in the opposite direction.
The third point is that, consistent with his confidence in high
taxes, Obama is a great defender of stimulus programs, without
having any knowledge of how they work, or, more accurately,
don't work. The first point about the stimulus program is that,
like everything else, it is subject to diminishing marginal returns.
If a president really believes that every dollar spent by the federal
government generates 1.5-fold levels of economic activity, when
every dollar spent by private parties generates no such positive
multiplier, then by all means load up on public expenditures. But
the price tag is high: what happens in practice is that society will
use more and more dollars to produce fewer and fewer things. In
the end, the only way to create jobs by a stimulus program is to
count the jobs that are funded by the government cheques and to
ignore all the jobs that were lost because of the tax revenues that
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were sucked out of the private sector to fund those government
programs. Looking at direct benefits and ignoring indirect costs
is a sure way to undermine sound public accounting.
How do we know in fact that that this approach is wrong? Well,
the unemployment rate remains stubbornly close to ten percent,
and there it will stay until the government starts to liberalize both
capital and labor markets, by a consistent program of growth
through deregulation and lower taxation. (I made this point in
March of 2010, and it remains true in January of 2011.) Money
spent on compliance produces little or no gains. In no matter can
it be regarded as a mark of economic probity. So in principle, it is
back to Adam Smith. A prosperous nation must have a stable legal
regime; it must have low and stable taxes so that people can have
confidence in their long time horizons. But the current tendency
is the opposite. Even the 2010 tax cuts last only for two years on
ordinary income capital gains, and the estate tax. Other gimmicks
last for one, and are only awarded to people who meet exacting
conditions that do not reflect rational resource use. Those constant reliance on stop-and-go economics is the bane of a return to
prosperity. The real question is whether political leaders of either
party are prepared to acknowledge this truth. Or will they, as is
all too common, resort to the excuse that they have to push hard
for a new subsidy in their favor in order to offset an illicit subsidy
given to their competitors.
This last observation points out a grim truth: political life in
America will remain in a downward equilibrium unless and until
key government actors press for fundamental reform. Unless that
is done, here is what will happen. The American capital markets
will lose their dominant status under the weight of misguided
taxation, regulation, and subsidies. It is quite clear that domestic markets cannot generate the capital needed for funding the
chronic deficits, so that the U.S. will have to borrow from overseas
to fund its current standard of living, leaving the next generation
to fend for itself. The risk is that the United States will start to look
like Argentina - or is it Greece, Spain, or Portugal? The United
States as a nation has passed the point where it can make excuses
for its low growth rate and high level of transfer programs. It has
to compete with other nations that have decided to lower such
key measures as the corporate tax rate in order to attract capital. The nation cannot live with the illusion that it can maintain
any respectable level of growth with its current level of transfer
payments and regulation. Many people in the United States have
trembled in light of these truths. The question for us as a nation is
whether they will be able to prevail against the powerful interests
that are working hard to maintain an unsustainable status quo.
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